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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to back-
door attacks which can hide backdoor triggers in DNNs
by poisoning training data. A backdoored model behaves
normally on clean test images, yet consistently predicts a
particular target class for any test examples that contain
the trigger pattern. As such, backdoor attacks are hard
to detect, and have raised severe security concerns in
real-world applications. Thus far, backdoor research has
mostly been conducted in the image domain with image
classification models. In this paper, we show that existing
image backdoor attacks are far less effective on videos,
and outline 4 strict conditions where existing attacks are
likely to fail: 1) scenarios with more input dimensions (eg.
videos), 2) scenarios with high resolution, 3) scenarios
with a large number of classes and few examples per class
(a “sparse dataset”), and 4) attacks with access to correct
labels (eg. clean-label attacks). We propose the use of a
universal adversarial trigger as the backdoor trigger to at-
tack video recognition models, a situation where backdoor
attacks are likely to be challenged by the above 4 strict
conditions. We show on benchmark video datasets that our
proposed backdoor attack can manipulate state-of-the-art
video models with high success rates by poisoning only a
small proportion of training data (without changing the
labels). We also show that our proposed backdoor attack
is resistant to state-of-the-art backdoor defense/detection
methods, and can even be applied to improve image
backdoor attacks. Our proposed video backdoor attack
not only serves as a strong baseline for improving the
robustness of video models, but also provides a new
perspective for more understanding more powerful back-
door attacks.(https://github.com/ShihaoZhaoZSH/Video-
Backdoor-Attack)
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are a family of power-
ful models that have been widely used to achieve state-
†Correspondence to: Xingjun Ma (xingjun.ma@unimelb.edu.au) and
Yu-Gang Jiang (ygj@fudan.edu.cn)
Figure 1. An example of clean-label poisoned videos by clean-
label backdoor attack Turner et al. [28] (top) and our proposed
attack with universal adversarial backdoor trigger (bottom).
of-the-art performance in many applications such as im-
age classification [10], natural language processing [24] and
video recognition [1]. Despite great success, DNNs have
been criticized due to their low transparency, poor inter-
pretability, and more importantly vulnerabilities to adver-
sarial attacks [25, 8, 16, 30, 32, 31] and backdoor attacks
[9, 2, 15, 28, 33]. This has raised concerns for the devel-
opment of DNNs in applications such as face recognition
[21, 3], autonomous driving [5], video analysis [11], and
medical diagnosis [7, 17].
Compared with adversarial attacks which are test time
attacks but on clean models, backdoor attacks pose more se-
vere threats by installing a hidden trigger into a target model
at training time. In particular, a backdoor attack poisons
training data with a backdoor trigger (or pattern) so as to set
up a link between the backdoor pattern and a target label.
Models trained on poisoned data will remember the trigger
pattern, and at test time, consistently predict a particular tar-
get class whenever the trigger pattern is present. Backdoor
attacks are hard to detect since backdoored models still per-
form accurately on clean validation or test data. Backdoor
attacks can happen in scenarios when users download DNN
models from an untrusted party or train models on data col-
lected from unreliable sources, which is quite common in
deep learning. The study of backdoor attacks has thus be-
come crucial for secure deep learning.
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CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 VOC2012-10 UCF-10 UCF-101 UCF-101 (ours)
Success rate (%) 78.2 43.7 25.2 47.2 1.1 82.2
Sparse dataset × √ × × √ √
High resolution × × √ × √ √
Video × × × √ √ √
Table 1. The attack success rate (%) of existing clean-label backdoor attack Turner et al. [28] under different strict conditions. The
attack was applied to poison 30% of training examples in the target class using trigger size of 1% image area. ”High resolution” refers
to images/frames of size 224 × 224 (compared with size 32 × 32), while ”sparse dataset” refers to CIFAR-100 [13] and UCF-101 [22]
(compared with other 10-class datasets). Datasets VOC2012-10 and UCF-10 consist of 10 random classes from VOC2012 [4] and UCF-101
[22] respectively. We use target model ResNet50 [10] for all image datasets and I3D [1] for video datasets and the first class (alphabetical
order) as the target class. The last column shows result of our proposed attack under the most strict condition (eg. UCF-101).
Existing backdoor attacks can be categorized into two
types: 1) poison-label attacks which not only poison train-
ing examples but also change training labels (to the tar-
get class); and 2) clean-label attacks which poison only
training examples while leaving training labels unchanged.
Compared with poison-label attacks, clean-label attacks are
more stealthy and resistant to data filtering or detection
techniques [28]. While existing clean-label backdoor at-
tacks have mostly been studied in the image domain with
image classification models, their effectiveness in more de-
manding conditions such as on videos is still unexplored.
In this paper, we close this gap by proposing the first video
backdoor attack.
Surprisingly, we find that existing backdoor attacks are
far less effective on videos, and outline 4 strict conditions
where existing image backdoor attacks are likely to fail: 1)
scenarios with more input dimensions (eg. videos vs im-
ages), 2) scenarios with high resolution (eg. 224 × 224 vs
32 × 32), 3) scenarios with a large number of classes hav-
ing very few examples per class (a “sparse dataset”), and
4) attacks with access to the correct labels (eg. clean-label
attacks). We use 5 different datasets to simulate the first 3
strict conditions under the clean-label setting (eg. the fourth
condition), and test the attack success rate of one state-of-
the-art clean-label backdoor attack Turner et al. [28] under
different strict conditions in Table 1. We find that the ex-
isting attack Turner et al. [28] has low effectiveness under
certain conditions, and fails almost completely (attack suc-
cess rate is only 1.1%) on video dataset UCF-101 where all
the 4 strict conditions are satisfied. These results emphasize
the necessity of designing effective clean-label backdoor at-
tack under more realistic conditions.
To address the limitations of existing backdoor attacks
under strict conditions, in this paper, we propose a universal
adversarial trigger for backdoor attack against video recog-
nition models. The universal adversarial trigger is generated
by exploiting adversarial technique [8, 25] to minimize the
classification loss from non-target classes to the target class.
When used to poison training data, we also apply adversar-
ial perturbation on the target image to force the target model
to focus more on the trigger pattern. Different to universal
adversarial perturbation [19, 20] crafted to fool DNN mod-
els at test time (eg. adversarial attacks), here we exploit it
as a trigger pattern for more powerful backdoor attacks. As
shown in Table 1, using the same poisoning rate and trigger
size, our proposed attack can achieve a significantly higher
success rate of 82.2%. An example of our generated univer-
sal adversarial trigger is illustrated in Figure 1.
Our main contributions are:
• We study the problem of clean-label backdoor attack
against video recognition models, and develop a novel
approach to execute backdoor attacks under strict con-
ditions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work on video backdoor attacks.
• We propose a universal adversarial trigger and two
types of adversarial perturbations for more effective
backdoor attack on videos, and demonstrate, on two
benchmark video datasets against two state-of-the-art
video recognition models, that our proposed attack is
far more effective than existing backdoor attacks.
• We show that our video backdoor attack: 1) cannot
be completely avoided by existing backdoor detection
methods; 2) can generally be applied to improve back-
door attacks on image models.
2. Related work
We review existing backdoor attacks proposed for image
classification models, backdoor defense methods, and state-
of-the-art DNN models used for video recognition.
2.1. Backdoor Attack
Backdoor attack is a type of data poisoning attack that
injects some trigger pattern into the training data so that the
trained model will make incorrect predictions whenever the
trigger pattern is present. Existing backdoor attacks can be
categorized into two types: 1) poison-label attacks that not
only poison training examples but also change their labels
(to a target class); and 2) clean-label attacks that only poison
training examples while leaving their labels unchanged.
BadNets. Gu et al. [9] first investigated backdoor attacks in
the deep learning pipeline, and proposed the Badnets attack.
BadNets injects a trigger pattern (sticker or checkerboard)
to a set of randomly selected training images. Given a tar-
get class of the attacker’s interest, the poisoned images are
usually selected from the other classes than the target class,
and their labels will be changed to the target class. This is to
explicitly associate the poisoned images to the target class.
Different trigger patterns have been proposed for poison-
label attacks. For example, an additional image attached
onto or blended into the target image [2], a fixed water-
mark on the target image [23], or one fixed pixel (for low
resolution (32 × 32) images). Since the poisoned images
are mislabeled, poison-label attacks can be easily detected
by simple data filtering or human inspection [28].
Clean-label backdoor attacks. To make the attack less ob-
vious, Turner et al. [28] proposed the clean-label backdoor
attack which does not need to change the labels of poisoned
images. Since the clean-label poisoned images still have la-
bels that are consistent with their main contents, clean-label
backdoor attacks are more difficult to detect. However, this
significantly increases the difficulty of the attack as the trig-
ger pattern is no longer strongly associated with the target
class, thus may get filtered out easily as irrelevant informa-
tion by convolutional operations. Turner et al. [28] further
introduced two techniques to make the attack more effec-
tive: 1) latent space interpolation using GANs and 2) adver-
sarial perturbations bounded by `p-norm. Both techniques
can force the model to learn the trigger pattern instead of
the original contents of the image. Although high success
rate can be achieved under easy conditions, i.e., on low-
resolution image datasets, this attack has failed under strict
conditions imposed by video datasets, as we have shown in
Table 1. In this paper, we propose a more powerful back-
door trigger to address the limitations of Turner et al. [28]
in attacking video recognition models.
2.2. Backdoor Defense
Several detection methods have been proposed to defend
against backdoor attacks. The simplest and most natural
way is to perform data augmentation by introducing flips
and crops to eliminate the trigger pattern. Other detection
methods exploit feature characteristics of backdoor images
to train effective detection classifiers.
Spectral signatures. Tran et al. [27] propose a method to
avoid backdoor attacks by detecting the presence of poi-
soned examples in the training set, based on Spectral Sig-
natures. The intuition is that poisoned data may appear ab-
normal in the latent DNN space compared with clean data
in the same class. The user can remove the backdoor out-
liers from the training set via singular value decomposition
(SVD), then retrain the model on the purified data.
Neural cleanse. Wang et al. [29] propose Neural Cleanse
to avoid backdoor attacks by examining whether or not a
trained model is infected. Neural Cleanse exploits gradient
information to reverse engineer possible triggers, then de-
tect outliers (eg. triggers) using a robust statistics measure
called median absolute deviation (MAD). Neural Cleanse is
based on the assumption that smaller modifications are re-
quired to cause misclassification in an infected model com-
pared with a clean model.
2.3. Video Recognition Models
State-of-the-art video recognition models include the In-
flated 3D ConvNet (I3D) [1] and the CNN+LSTM [34, 12].
The I3D model is based on 2D ConvNet inflation and pool-
ing kernels of traditional 2D CNNs and is able to learn hier-
archical spatial-temporal information directly from videos.
The CNN+LSTM model combines the advantages of both
CNNs and LSTMs, that is, it utilizes CNN to extract spa-
tial representations and LSTM to exploit the temporal in-
formation contained in successive frames. In addition, op-
tical flow information is widely used in two-stream video
recognition networks to improve the models’ performance
[6]. In this paper, we will apply our attack to invade I3D and
CNN+LSTM models while discussing the effect of optical
flow information in backdoor attacks.
3. Proposed Video Backdoor Attack
In this section, we introduce our proposed backdoor at-
tack on video recognition models. We first describe our
threat model and overview the attack pipeline, then outline
how to generate and apply the proposed universal adversar-
ial trigger for the attack.
3.1. Threat Model
The adversary in our setting is allowed to inject a small
number of perturbed samples into the training set. The goal
of the attack is to induce the network trained by end users to
consistently predict a target class when the backdoor trigger
is presented, but behave normally on clean data. Specifi-
cally, the adversary is assumed to know the architecture of
the network that the end user uses and have access to train-
ing data, but has no permission to know any other configu-
ration of the user’s training procedure. For stealthiness, we
implement our attack under the clean-label setting.
3.2. Overview of the Attack Pipeline
The structure of our proposed pipeline is illustrated in
Figure 2. It consists of three steps: (a) Trigger generation.
Given a clean training set and a clean-trained model on the
data, this step will generate a universal adversarial trigger
using gradient information through iterative optimization.
(b) Adversarial perturbation. We minimize an adversarial
loss using Projected Gradient Descent [18] (PGD) to pro-
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Figure 2. Overview of our attack pipeline. (a) Trigger Generation generates a universal adversarial trigger pattern specific to a task. (b)
Adversarial Perturbation produces videos with manipulated features. We implement the attack by injecting the trigger into perturbed videos
and providing them to users for training. We apply the same trigger pattern to videos during the test procedure.
duce videos with adversarial perturbations towards the tar-
get class. (c) Poisoning and inference. We inject the gener-
ated trigger (by step (a)) into perturbed videos (by step (b))
as poisoned samples for training. At the inference stage, we
trick the target model trained on the poisoned data to pre-
dict the target class by attaching our universal adversarial
trigger to a test video.
3.3. Backdoor Trigger Generation
Given a clean-trained model on the clean training data,
we optimize to find a trigger pattern that minimizes the
cross entropy loss towards the target class. The trigger pat-
tern is patched and optimized on videos from all non-target
classes but relabeled to the target class. This forces the
network to predict the target class when the trigger pattern
presents.
Specifically, given a trigger mask m, a trigger pattern t,
videos in non-target categories x, one-hot vector of target
label y with dimension l, we generate a universal adversar-
ial trigger pattern by minimizing the cross-entropy loss as
following,
min
t
∑M
i=1− 1l
∑l
j=1 yj log(hj(x˜i)), (1)
where M is the total number of training samples from non-
target classes, h = F (x˜) is the softmax output of the clean-
trained model, x˜ = (1 − m) ∗ x + m ∗ t is the poisoned
samples. By minimizing the above loss, we can find the uni-
versal (the same trigger pattern t for all non-target videos)
adversarial trigger for a certain training dataset targeted to a
target class.
The trigger pattern t is generated as follows. We first take
a small region at the bottom right corner of the input video
as the trigger area, and randomly initialize the area while
mask off the other areas. During training, we iteratively per-
turb the trigger area on different videos from all non-target
classes (which are re-labeled to the target class). In other
words, the perturbed trigger area on one video is kept and
Algorithm 1 Universal Adversarial Trigger Generation
Require:
Model F ,Trigger Mask m, Learning Rate α, Non Tar-
get Videos Set S = {(x(j), y(j))}Mj=1, Target Label y,
Total Steps N , Trigger Size w, Batch Size B
Ensure: Universal Trigger t
1: t = InitializeTrigger(w)
2: for i in range(N) do
3: Si = {(x(j), y(j))}Bj=1 = RandomlyPick(S,B)
4: x˜(j) = (1−m) ∗ x(j) +m ∗ t, (x(j), y(j)) ∈ Si
5: h = F (x˜(j))
6: L =
∑B
j=1− 1l
∑l
k=1[y
(j)
k log(hk)]
7: δ = ∂L∂t
8: t = t− α ∗ sign(δ)
9: end for
10: return t
passed along to other videos for further perturbation. The
complete generation algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
3.4. Enhancing Backdoor Trigger
In order to enhance the backdoor trigger and make the
features of the original videos less salient, we perform ad-
versarial perturbation, a kind of unnoticeable and structured
noise, to the clean video sample before applying our back-
door trigger. This reduces the interference of the original
content and encourage the network to pay more attention to
the trigger [28].
Specifically, we randomly sample a certain proportion of
videos in the target class and adversarially perturb them by
PGD. These perturbed videos are then patched by our uni-
versal adversarial backdoor trigger (generated in the pre-
vious step) as poisoned samples. Formally, given a clean-
trained model F and a target video x, we construct the ad-
versarial perturbation η by maximizing the loss L as,
max
‖η‖∞<
L(x+ η), (2)
where, ‖·‖∞ is the `∞-norm, and  is the maximum per-
turbation. We introduce two types of perturbations (corre-
sponding to two different loss functions). They are both
intuitively useful for effective backdoor attacks and are em-
pirically evaluated in Section 4.3.
Uniform adversarial perturbation. It perturbs the output
probability to a uniform distribution so as to weaken the
learning of the original features towards any classes. Ac-
cordingly, the loss function L is,
L =
1
l
l∑
j=1
yˆj log(hj), (3)
where h = F (xˆ) is the softmax output, xˆ = x + η is the
perturbed sample, yˆ = [ 1l , · · · , 1l ], and l is the number of
classes. Note that maximizing this loss function is equiv-
alent to minimizing the cross entropy loss with respect to
yˆ. Videos with this uniform adversarial perturbation tend to
lose any strong natural features. Thus, the model will more
responsive to salient characteristics such as the backdoor
trigger pattern.
Targeted adversarial perturbation. This perturbation has
been proposed in the field of adversarial research for tar-
geted adversarial attacks [8, 18, 25]. Given an input video
x from the target class y, the loss function L is defined as,
L = −1
l
l∑
j=1
yj log(hj), (4)
where h = F (xˆ) is the softmax output, xˆ = x+η is the per-
turbed sample and l is the number of classes. Empirically,
we find that targeted perturbations may switch the network’s
output from one class to another with overconfident predic-
tion. Thus, when applied with these perturbations, the per-
turbed video tends to have a strong pattern towards another
class in deep feature space. This also forces the target model
to capture the trigger pattern during training.
3.5. Attack with the Universal Adversarial Trigger
Poisoning and inference. To complete our attack, we in-
ject the universal adversarial trigger generated in Section
3.3 into perturbed videos obtained in Section 3.4. The poi-
soned videos are provided to users along with the rest of
clean videos for training. At the inference stage, we patch
the same trigger to test videos and the infected model will
be manipulated to output the target class. At this point, we
have implemented a complete backdoor attack.
Analysis. We briefly emphasize here that we study clean-
label backdoor attacks in video from two complementary
aspects. The universal adversarial trigger is the foundation
of our method. It contains abundant inherent information
which caters to the prior distribution of the target class,
which makes video attacks possible and practical. Two dif-
ferent adversarial perturbations significantly interfere with
the original features of videos in the target class to induce
the model to learn more about the trigger pattern.
4. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our pro-
posed backdoor attack on video recognition models, and re-
sistance to state-of-the-art backdoor detection methods. We
also conduct a comprehensive ablation study on various as-
pects of our attack.
4.1. Experimental Settings
Datasets and DNN models. We consider two bench-
mark datasets for video recognition: UCF-101 [22] and
HMDB-51 [14], and two state-of-the-art video recogni-
tion models: I3D and CNN+LSTM. For I3D, we use a
kinetics-400 pretrained model to initialize and sample 64
frames per video for finetuning on UCF-101 and HMDB-
51. For CNN+LSTM, we use a fixed ImageNet pretrained
ResNet50 as the CNN feature extractor and train LSTM on
top of it. Input video frames are subsampled by keeping one
out of every 5 for CNN+LSTM model. The test accuracy of
these models can be found in Table 3. We use these clean-
trained models to generate the universal adversarial triggers
and adversarial perturbations. The size of input frame in
both two models is set to 224 × 224. Here, we only con-
sider RGB models, and later in Section 4.4, we will analyze
our attacks on two-stream networks that consist of RGB and
optical flow information.
Model UCF-101 HMDB-51
I3D 91.5 63.4
CNN+LSTM 76.6 45.3
Table 3. Test accuracy (%) of the video models.
Baselines and attack setting. We transfer the image-based
clean-label backdoor attack in [28] directly to video frames
as our baseline. For the baseline attack, we choose the PGD
method bounded in `∞-norm to apply adversarial perturba-
tions (also for our targeted adversarial perturbations). Then,
we install a fixed static trigger (Figure 4) into frames of
poisoned videos. We implement our attack following the
pipeline in Section 3 and utilize the targeted adversarial per-
turbations here for fair comparison. It is worth mentioning
that the accuracy of the infected models on clean test set has
no obvious decline compared with clean trained models (in
some cases, the test accuracy are even higher). All our at-
tacks are applied under the clean-label setting. We generate
our universal adversarial triggers using Algorithm 1, with
learning rate α = 1 for 2000 steps. In each step, we ran-
domly sample 10 videos to calculate the average gradient.
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Figure 3. The attack success rates with respect to two factors: trigger size (left) and poisoning percentage (right). We set poisoning
percentage to 30% (which accounts for 0.3%/0.6% of all the data in UCF-101/HMDB-51) when we vary the trigger size, while setting
trigger size to be 20 × 20 when varying the poisoning percentage. For all experiments, we choose the first class (in alphabetical order) to
be the target label (eg. ApplyEyeMakeup in UCF-101 and brush hair in HMDB-51)
Method \ class ApplyEyeMakeup Biking
Clean&
Jerk
Frisbee
Catch
Horse
Race
Long
Jump
Playing
Dhol Punch Skiing Taichi
Baseline 1.1 0.5 0.0 3.8 0.1 0.0 2.9 0.6 0.0 2.6
Ours 82.2 76.2 87.5 88.0 70.2 74.9 91.3 82.5 81.7 86.0
Table 2. Comparison of the attack success rates (%) on 10 different categories of UCF-101 against I3D model.
For adversarial perturbation, we optimize Eqn. (2) using
PGD with  = 16.
Evaluation metric. The attack success rate (ASR) is se-
lected as the evaluation metric, which is the fraction of in-
puts not labeled as the target class but misclassified to the
target class after the backdoor trigger is applied. All exper-
iments are run on a GeForce GTX 1080Ti GPU.
4.2. Effectiveness of Our Approach
Attack success rates with varying trigger sizes. We
first evaluate the attack performance under different trigger
sizes. The results are shown in the left subfigure of Figure
3. As can be observed, the baseline attack has an extremely
low level of attack success rate even when the trigger size
is as large as 32, while the attack success rate of our attack
rises rapidly with the increase of the trigger size and reach
a plateau eventually. Against I3D model on UCF-101, our
proposed attack achieves 61.2% even at a small trigger size
of 16 (which only accounts for 0.005% of the total image
area). When the trigger size increases to 28, our attack can
successfully attack the target model 93.7% of the time. In
general, larger trigger size leads to stronger attack. How-
ever, this will inevitably make the trigger more conspicuous.
A trade-off should be made between attack success rate and
stealthiness in real-world application.
Attack success rates under different poisoning percent-
ages. We then demonstrate the impact of poisoning per-
centage (eg. the proportion of poisoned videos in the tar-
get class) on the attack performance. We choose the same
class used above as the target class and fix trigger size to
20×20. The attack success rate with respect to different poi-
soning percentages is shown in the right subfigure of Figure
3. Besides the poor performance of the baseline attack, we
find that attack success rate does not increase monotonically
with the poisoning percentage, instead, it first rises then
drops. The attack success rate is over 60% when poisoning
percentage varies from 20% to 70%, but decreases dramat-
ically once out of this range (even reduces to nearly 0% at
poisoning percentage of 100%). We suspect this surprising
phenomenon is caused by the following reason. The uni-
versal adversarial trigger is designed to reflect the inherent
pattern of the target class. If the poisoning percentage is ex-
cessively high that there are few clean videos are left in the
target class, the model will learn almost nothing about the
original features of the target class and turn to new features
that are more salient than the trigger generated by the clean-
trained model, resulting in a rapid decline in performance.
We further choose 10 categories in UCF-101 as the target
class respectively against the I3D model under the best poi-
soning percentage of 30% (trigger size is set to 20 × 20).
The results are shown in Table 2. Our attack performs well
and is significantly better than the baseline attack across all
the 10 target categories.
4.3. Ablation Study
To better understand our attack, we perform extensive
ablation studies with 3 different types of triggers enhanced
by two different adversarial perturbations (eg. uniform ver-
sus targeted). We train I3D models on UCF-101/HMDB-51
and choose ApplyEyeMakeup as the target category. We set
trigger size to be 20 × 20 and poisoning percentage to be
30%. The results are shown in Table 4.
We first explore three different types of triggers: 1) fixed
static trigger, 2) randomly sampled trigger, and 3) univer-
Fixed static trigger Randomly sampled trigger Universal adversarial trigger
None targeted uniform None targeted uniform None targeted uniform
UCF-101 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 1.7 61.1 82.2 76.9
HMDB-51 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 69.2 81.0 81.7
Table 4. Attack success rates (%) of our proposed attack with three different types of triggers: fixed static trigger, randomly dynamic
trigger (which has different random patterns among frames), universal adversarial trigger, and two different perturbations: no perturbation,
targeted perturbation and uniform perturbation. Best results are highlighted in bold.
(a)
(e)
|
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(j)
|
Figure 4. Examples of different triggers: (a) a fixed static trig-
ger we use in both video and image tasks as our baseline. (b)-
(e) our universal adversarial trigger on 4 different frames in a
video for target class “ApplyEyeMakeup in UCF-101 against I3D
model. (F)-(G): universal adversarial triggers for 5 categories
(eg. “aeroplane”, “bus, “diningtable, “pottedplant and “tvmonitor)
from VOC2012 image classification.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 5. Examples of different poisoned data. (a)/(b): videos poi-
soned by fixed static trigger/universal adversarial trigger. (c)/(d):
optical flow information of corresponding videos in (b) in x/y di-
rections. (e)/(f): images poisoned by fixed static trigger/universal
adversarial trigger (respectively for 4 target categories in 4 differ-
ent experiments) .
sal adversarial trigger. As can be seen from Table 4, nei-
ther the fixed static trigger nor the randomly sampled trig-
ger are effective. The usage of universal adversarial trig-
ger drastically increases the attack success rate. Both of
the two different adversarial enhancements (eg. targeted
versus uniform) can improve success rate by around 10%
- 20%, with targeted adversarial perturbation more effective
on UCF-101 dataset while uniform adversarial perturbation
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Figure 6. Comparative results on the image task. The target model
is a ResNet50 with input size 224 × 224. We follow the same
pipeline in [28] as our baseline and apply the same targeted adver-
sarial perturbation (for enhancement) for both attacks. The trigger
size is 30 × 30 and  in Eqn. (2) is 8. (All triggers are illustrated
in Figure 3)
more effective on HMDB-51 dataset.
4.4. Attacking Two-stream Video Models
Optical flow information is often exploited to improve
the performance of video recognition models. Here, we test
this factor in our attack. We utilize both RGB and optical
flow as inputs to construct a two-stream network. For our
attack, we first inject the RGB trigger to videos, then gener-
ate optical flow of these poisoned videos using TVL1 algo-
rithm [26]. We choose the average function to fuse the two
streams and test on UCF-101 with I3D model. We visualize
an example of poisoned RGB inputs and its corresponding
optical flow input in Figure 5.
We find that the optical flow inhibits backdoor attack to
some extent. When trigger size is set to 20 × 20 and poi-
soning percentage 0.7, the attack success rate is 15.2% on
optical flow network, 68.5% on RGB network and 54.7%
on fused two-stream network. This degradation of perfor-
mance is mainly attributed to the independence of the RGB
space to the optical flow space, which makes transfer of
the universal adversarial trigger generated in the RGB space
less effective in the optical flow space.
4.5. Improving Image Backdoor Attacks
Here, we explore the generalization capability of our at-
tack on images against image classification models. The
Conditions #Clean #Poisoned
#Clean
removed
#Poisoned
removed
Trigger
Perturbation 71 30 2 28
Trigger 71 30 1 29
Perturbation 71 30 18 12
Table 5. Detection performance of spectral signatures [27] against
our attack on I3D model and UCF-101 dataset. We use set ε to 1.5,
trigger size to 20 × 20, poisoning percentage to 30% and seelct
target class “ApplyEyeMakeup”.
experiments are conducted on VOC2012 which is a “sparse
dataset”(20 classes, around 400 images per class) and high
resolution (224 × 224). We randomly choose 5 target cate-
gories and test the attack success rates under different poi-
soning percentages. The results are shown in Figure 6.
Again, our method can effectively improve the attack per-
formance under these strict conditions (eg. sparse dataset
and high resolution) with images. The results confirm the
effectiveness and generalization of our proposed attack on
images, especially under strict conditions.
4.6. Resistance to Backdoor Defense Methods
Resistance to data augmentation. Data augmentation is
a common technique to diversify datasets, which includes
randomly sampling, cropping, or rotating some frames in
video recognition tasks. This process might reduce the per-
formance of backdoor attacks by randomly removing or de-
stroying the trigger patched to the poisoned videos. To test
whether it is an effective way to avoid our attacks, we do
experiments using I3D trained on UCF-101. We set trig-
ger size to 20 × 20, and poisoning percentage to 30%.
With data augmentation, the attack success rate can still
reach 56.3%. This is because our universal adversarial trig-
ger is powerful enough that it achieves great attack results
even with an extremely low poisoning percentage (68.1% at
poisoning percentage of 0.001% with respect to the entire
dataset). In practice, data augmentation can be effectively
evaded by simply increasing the poisoning percentage.
Resistance to spectral signature detection. As mentioned
in Section 2.2, Tran et al. [27] proposes Spectral Signatures
to detect backdoor attacks by filtering suspected samples
in training set. We conduct experiments to test whether or
not this defense method can detect our attack. The results
are shown in Table 5. We find that most of the poisoned
videos are removed by this method (28/30 for “Trigger and
Perturbation” and 29/30 for “Trigger”) once the universal
adversarial trigger presents. Their success may be caused
by huge separation of distributions between poisoned and
clean videos in latent space by our attack. However, as we
have empirically shown in the right subfigure of Figure 3
that our attack can still achieve high success rate > 40%
even when only < 1% of data is poisoned.
Resistance to neural cleanse. As discussed in Section 2.2,
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Figure 7. Backdoor using Neural Cleanse [29]. Left: Anomaly
measurement of backdoored vs clean model by how much the class
with the smallest trigger deviates from the remaining classes. An
anomaly index> 2 indicates a detected backdoored model. Right:
`1-norm of triggers for infected vs uninfected classes in back-
doored I3D model by our attack [29]. Box plot shows min/max
and quarterlies, and the dot represents the target class. Detailed
interpretation of the two plots can be find in [29].
Neural Cleans detects whether a trained model has been in-
fected by backdoor attacks, for which it assumes that sam-
ples generally require smaller modifications to be misclassi-
fied into the target class. Here, we test the resistance of our
proposed attack to Neural Cleans with I3D model on UCF-
101 dataset, trigger size 20 × 20 and poisoning percentage
30%. As shown in Figure 7, Neural Cleans fails to detect the
backdoored I3D model by our attack, i.e., anomaly index
< 2 for the backfoored model. This is because the modifi-
cations made by their reversed triggers has similar effect in
the deep feature space as our universal adversarial trigger,
thus no difference (or outlier) can be detected. Thereby, our
proposed attack is resistant to Neural Cleanse.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the problem of backdoor
attack on video recognition models. We outline 4 strict con-
ditions posed by videos, and show existing backdoor attacks
are likely to fail under these conditions. To address this, we
propose the use of a universal adversarial trigger and two
types of adversarial perturbation for more effective back-
door attacks with videos. We show on benchmark video
datasets that our proposed backdoor attack can manipulate
state-of-the-art video models with high success rates by poi-
soning only a small proportion of training data. We also
show that our proposed backdoor attack is resistant to state-
of-the-art backdoor detection methods to some extent, and
can even be applied to improve image backdoor attacks.
Our proposed video backdoor attack can serve as a strong
baseline for improving the robustness of video models.
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